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Benefiting from an Understanding of Economic and 
Political Markets Includes Recognition That Engineers 
Themselves Can Change These Environments
S ponsored research from a NSF Foundation/Whitaker Foundation initiative on cost-reducing technologies 
brought together faculty from engineering, medicine, 
and social sciences to link economic and policy as­
sessments to engineering design. The technology under devel­
opment is to be an inexpensive, easy-to-use monitor for 
self-management of metabolic diseases by patients, with spe­
cific application to phenylketonuria (PKU). While the tech­
nology remains in development, the experience, including 
discussions with others in the Whitaker and National Science 
foundations’ program, raised interesting issues about eco­
nomics. policy, and cost-reducing technologies.
The project’s initial focus and purpose, of enhancing cost- 
consciousncss in hcalthcarc technology, evolved to consider 
opportunities of the information age and changing expecta­
tions of patients’ roles in their own hcalthcarc management. 
Technology development is an iterative experience that, when 
thus understood. 1) is benefited by economic and policy anal­
ysis that is incremental and integrated rather than definitive 
and independent. 2) has more cost-reducing potential as mar­
ket incentives change. 3) can be efficiently improved by a 
stronger base of accessible information, and 4) has potentially 
important roles for patients in using, facilitating, and shaping 
future technology.
Two additional thoughts concern presumptions of policy 
and economic analyses. First, in assessing policies and poli­
tics on the basis of the distribution of benefits and costs, 
avoid presumptions that politics arc zero-sum confronta­
tions. Second, in assessing economic markets by the ways 
hcalthcarc fails to meet presumptions of classical economic 
theory, consider not just the present market but future 
changes and supplements.
Learning Through Incremental 
and  Integrated Analysis
While the purpose of this multidisciplinary project concerned 
the influence of economics and policy upon technology, the 
work soon surfaced the reversed linkages: the influence of 
technology upon economics and policy, particularly by the ef­
fects of technology that increases the role of patients in select­
ing and managing their care. Exploring, with clinicians and 
families, the economics of PKU suggested that inexpensive 
and easy-to-use monitors could change treatment. Monitoring
could be far more frequent (even several times per day rather 
than once per month), would provide more reliable measures 
(for example, reducing the temptation to relax compliance 
with dietary guidelines between tests), and give instant feed­
back (rather than the days or weeks for present testing) to 
more clearly relate body chemistry to behavior (eating and ex­
ercise). This would increase the family’s understanding of the 
condition and its treatment and the family’s ability, approach, 
and motivation for managing it. It also could change treat­
ments by providing new insights among clinicians and more 
powerful tools for researchers.
The potential evolution in treatment and family responsi­
bility reinforced an initial presumption that was made in this 
project that economic and policy assessments should not be 
made as one-time studies that, while sophisticated and thor­
ough. arc expensive in dollars and time and can provide infor­
mation that is too late to assist technology development. Like 
the technology development itself, economic and market im­
pact assessments seem most helpful as a succession of in­
creasingly sophisticated and targeted analyses, achieving a 
progressive precision as technology is developed and inte­
grated into practice. This allows an earlier connection with the 
technology development, enabling the assessments and the 
technology development to guide each other as they progress. 
Besides making sense, this is consistent with studies of inno­
vation [ 1 ]. [2]. which find that innovative technology develop­
ment is aided by having connections within a project 
development group between technical, commercial, and regu­
latory personnel.
Understanding hcalthcarc and other technology markets 
includes an understanding that the markets sometimes don’t 
just exist—they arc altered and sometimes created by the 
technology. The common direction of development is for a 
technology to go looking for a use. rather than for a need go­
ing looking for a new technology. Innovation tends to be 
“tcchnology-push” rather than “dcmand-pull” [3],
For all the above reasons, economic and policy assess­
ments arc better used in technology development as ways of 
thinking rather than as hard decision rules. They often offer 
incomplete answers to questions such as whether the market 
will support a developing technology, in our case a blood 
phenylalanine monitor, whose development had not yet deter­
mined whether the technology would develop into a
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stand-alone monitor or as a platform technology that will be 
applied to and supported by the treatment of a number of con­
ditions. But as ways of thinking, they are important in identi­
fying and understanding other important questions. Thus, in 
the case of phenylalanine monitors for PKU, questions raised 
included how benefits would be distributed among patients as 
well as among suppliers of medical services and technology. 
Also, how effectively would the market monetize benefits? 
Such questions lead the assessments and the technology de­
velopment to explore ways to better design a product or to a 
broader agenda about how to improve incentives by restruc­
turing the market. Does, or can, the monitor reduce, or in­
crease, the costs of physician support? Is, or could, quality of 
life be monetized by the market?
Technology, Costs, and  Incentives
The presumption of the NSF/Whitaker initiative, that 
technologies including devices can be cost saving, was not 
that technology alone could reduce the growth in health­
care expenditures. At the heart of the motivation behind 
the initiative was the growing consensus that technology de­
velopment was a cost-driver in the healthcare system as cur­
rently configured, and as the market for healthcare is being 
revolutionized, the development of cost-saving technologies 
may lag behind the emerging incentives to adopt such tech­
nologies. So the initiative's limited expectation was that 
cost-saving technologies can make significant differences in 
the future expenditures for healthcare. But this limited ex­
pectation still faced cynicism and perhaps even opposition 
from some observers of, and participants in, biotechnology 
who engaged in the discussions held as part of the initiative. 
The cynicism came because of the role technology has 
played in the escalation of healthcare expenditures. There 
may have been another concern, or even opposition, that a 
focus upon cost savings might jeopardize future high-cost, 
but ultimately worthwhile, advances.
The disagreements too often built upon failures to clarify 
terminology of purpose: was the project seeking technolo­
gies a) that individually reduce costs of treating (or prevent­
ing) an instance of a particular condition, even though the 
availability of the new technology may increase total health­
care costs by being used to treat conditions that otherwise 
would be untreated or less effectively treated; b) that individ­
ually reduces costs even when considering all uses of this 
particular technology; or c) that collectively, with all other 
new technologies, reduces the total cost of healthcare? 
Some, especially among the skeptics, considered anything 
short of the third (collective savings) a failure but worried
that such an outcome itself would constitute failure because 
it could be accomplished only by damaging the market for 
new technologies that, like the preponderant new technolo­
gies of the 20th century, provided treatments that increased 
the costs of healthcare and may or may not have passed a 
cost-effectiveness test.
Skeptics also presented arguments based upon inadequa­
cies of the market. Cost savings may more likely be found in 
technologies with early expenditures for future savings, as in 
the case of preventive treatments. But, skeptics point out, the 
market undervalues the long-term because of corporate quar­
terly reports and provider reluctance to make changes in pro­
cedures; the market fails to monetize quality of life for 
patients and their families; benefits may not be recouped by 
units that incur cost; and market forces, as configured, may be 
inadequate to support development of treatments for rare con­
ditions (such as PKU), even when they offer promise of reduc­
ing costs for the individual patient.
Some technologies escape these market barriers, such as im­
munizations and fluoridation. They may, as in immunizations, 
mean government or foundation subsidies of development, 
moving primary support from the for-profit to the public or 
not-for-profit sectors. Or they may, as in fluoridation, mean 
public assumption of operating costs. They also may mean, as 
they have in both of these cases, public programs of regulation 
and/or distribution to assure appropriate usage.
In other cases, various circumstances or means allow these 
barriers to be hurdled. As healthcare costs become concen­
trated among a few payers (for example, federal and state gov­
ernments), the full societal benefits of cost-reducing 
technologies are more fully recognized, increasing the incen­
tives and means to finance and apply such technologies. Im­
proved information also reduces the limits of healthcare 
markets. Outcome and expenditure data help understand cost 
implications of new technologies. Prevalence data, of condi­
tions and treatments, help predict the market and determine fi­
nancing for proposed technologies.
Information Is Efficient Support
Opportunities to connect technology development with eco­
nomic and policy assessments are enhanced by two aspects of 
information-age technology. The first is the expansion of data 
from healthcare payers/providers and of tools of medical in­
formatics. The second is the exploding possibilities of greater 
patient participation, especially through the Internet.
The first of these includes aggregation and use of clinical 
and administrative data. It addresses a major limitation of 
healthcare markets: lack of information, for example, for as-
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scssing effectiveness and cost-cffcctivcness of treatments and 
technology. Information systems, joining clinical data to as­
sess effectiveness and administrative data to assess cost-cffcc- 
tivcncss. promise both problems and benefits. If developed for 
managing the costs, and not also regularly employed to moni­
tor quality, such quality will be particularly susceptible to 
compromise. If more carefully developed, they can be cost-re­
ducing and quality-improving technology themselves and. ad­
ditionally. provide data to target and assess new technology. 
Developing and providing access to these data arc means to 
stimulate and support technology development. If these arc 
considered as government subsidies, they have potential ad­
vantages of 1) neutrality. 2) openness. 3) case of administra­
tion. 4) a narrower range of uncertainty. 5) shorter product 
development time, and 6) provider and consumer education 
(for rational treatment and product demand).
The importance of data is a theme that quickly developed 
during the project. Risk limits investments, of time or money, 
in technology development. Risk may be reduced by public 
investments, including investments in information, in loan 
guarantees, or in direct subsidies (of grants or tax prefer­
ences). Of the three, information docs the least to distort, and 
the most to promote, natural market forces. Finally, by in­
creasing understanding of care and outcomes, it offers guid­
ance in designing the technology.
In this project, wc found that economic assessments of 
healthcare technologies arc made easier, more complete, and 
more accurate by the growing collections of patient care and 
outcome data. These collections include the federal data for 
Medicare, the states' data for Medicaid, the federal assem­
blage of Medicaid data for a number of states, the claims of 
the private carriers, and the procedures and billing records of 
large providers. Because this project concerned a rare condi­
tion whose management is particularly important in infants 
and children, the Medicaid data and the data of large providers 
(e.g.. Kaiser/ Pcrmancntc) offered particular value.
The potential advantage of these data sets, however, was 
limited by the difficulty of gaining access to them. The expen­
ditures of time and money experienced in seeking access were 
beyond that affordable without the support of a foundation 
grant. The problem of gaining access to the data appeared to 
be problems of economics, not privacy. Particularly frustrat­
ing was the inability to access the federal depository of 
Medicaid data without paying fees of $50,000 to $100,000. 
These fees apparently arc intended to help finance the data set 
itself, rather than the much smaller costs of accessing the data. 
But if the public interest in technology innovation is sufficient 
to justify public support, one mcchanism should be the rela­
tively inexpensive, neutral, and market-correcting approach 
of improved access to information: to support technology as 
the Census supports commerce and industry.
Patients as Primary Players, in Care and  in Policy
An interest that developed with the project was how informa­
tion facilitates patient involvement. Technologies that provide 
easy, frequent, accurate, and relevant monitoring of chronic 
conditions can enhance patient involvement in their own 
healthcare. An inexpensive and simple monitor allows more 
frequent testing of body chcmistry and immediate reading of 
test results. This means quicker alerts to problems and imme­
diate feedback to encourage appropriate management. The 
project's experiments with frequent monitoring and rapid 
feedback suggested that patient involvement can enhance un­
derstanding of the condition and increase commitment to 
treatment protocols, as well as enabling more sensitive treat­
ment of the condition.
The project found it necessary to contrast these purposes 
with some rhetoric of patient empowerment. The perspective 
of the project was not upon a power struggle between patient 
and practitioner. In fact it was the opposite: to facilitate pa­
tient/practitioner. and even payer, teamwork in managing 
chronic conditions. It did open up the thinking of providers, 
payers, and patients by engaging the perspectives of the pa­
tients and their families. It surfaced an originally unantici­
pated value of the monitor: providing a tool for fincr-grain 
research of the cycles, progression, and treatment of PKU. It 
also revealed that payers, supplying the data base for the as­
sessments. were not aware of. and showed initial disbelief of. 
co-morbidities that providers and patients recognized and that 
their own data proved to be additional costs of poor manage­
ment of PKU.
It brought better understanding to the technology develop­
ment by connecting the development with the experiences of 
patients and families, both directly in the trials and less di­
rectly through the Internet connections of families concerned 
with PKU. It raised, and helped assess, questions of how im­
portant is it to the patient that such a monitor not involve the 
uncomfortable access to draw blood and how important is it to 
the physicians' trust and acceptance that blood, the tradition­
ally tested body fluid, be used rather than other body fluids not 
requiring such invasive access.
The growing Internet connections of patients and families 
open a final possibility of their involvement: the development 
of an effective political clientele to support the public policies 
to correct the limits of the market. These might include im­
proving the quality and availability of information, financing 
of research on the nature and treatment of the condition, or di­
rect services or financial support for those with the condition.
Reflections on Policy Perspectives
The project to engage economics, the “dismal science.” and 
political science, rooted in Machiavellian ruthlcssncss. 
needed the nourishment of optimism inherent in engineering.
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The focus on PKU added challenges of a limited market and 
little political clout. Further, the project involved a small re­
search operation, while a common (though questioned) pre­
sumption of the literature says the complexity of our 
science-based society favors large organizations to internalize 
a knowledge base and link R&D to production and marketing
[4], [5], [3]. Attempts to marry economics and policy too eas­
ily see zero-sum contests. But new technologies can lift policy 
beyond zero-sum conflicts by providing new benefits with 
which to oil compromise and cooperation that in turn further 
enhance benefits. A less expensive and more effective means 
to monitor a disease such as PKU enhances the likelihood that 
insurers will cover costs of such monitoring, hence enhancing 
the prevalence of the monitoring and reducing the costs of 
poor management of PKU.
One aspect of policy assessments is to understand the pol­
icy environment, at present and as it might evolve, in order to 
better see opportunities and challenges. Incentives supporting 
cost-saving technologies particularly depend upon the level 
and nature of pressures to contain costs.
For example, what interests will be particularly concerned 
with costs of healthcare? Society ultimately pays for health­
care, whether payment is made by patients, employers, or 
government. But who writes the check makes a difference in 
terms of what other expenditures compete with healthcare ex­
penditures: retirement benefits compete for federal expendi­
tures; education competes for state expenditures; and personal 
consumption competes for employer and patient expendi­
tures. Who writes the check also makes a difference in terms 
of market power and in the interests pursued by this power: 
government payment can concentrate bargaining power and 
can represent a particularly broad opportunity for affecting 
healthcare benefits and costs. But realization of this breadth is 
challenged by the very complexity of government that may 
relegate influence to narrow interests or concentrate upon a 
singular broad interest such as the budget.
This leads to a second aspect of policy analysis: how might 
the future policy environment be influenced? Will future pol­
icy be shaped by broad public discussion or by relatively pri­
vate negotiations in legislative committees and administrative 
agencies? Types of politics may be distinguished by how a 
proposal concentrates or distributes benefits and costs [6]. As 
an example, subsidizing medical technology to manage PKU 
concentrates benefits (for those suffering from the condition) 
and distributes costs (across the general public, as taxpayers), 
producing a “client” politics highly dependent upon organiz­
ing an effective interest group for private negotiations.
Policy changes may be critical, say, to use public subsidies 
to correct for a market that fails to recognize quality-of-life 
benefits from better technology for orphan conditions. Engi­
neers and patients interested in the technology usually lack the 
political capacity to make such changes, especially in the case
of orphan conditions. Cost-saving technologies can be 
valuable in these instances, if they make patient support less 
expensive and/or provide financial incentives for payers and 
providers to add their much more substantial political capaci­
ties. The connection between product development, practitio­
ners, and families with PKU was important in designing the 
sensor's properties, in financing the design, as well as think­
ing prospectively about selling the product.
This is not analysis of zero-sum conflicts, and it is signifi­
cantly different because the approach is to engineer better 
healthcare technology solutions. Successful engineering re­
duces costs relative to benefits, irrespective of whether or not 
it reduces costs. It offers a broader range of possibilities for 
managing politics: to whom and how might benefits be dif­
ferently distributed to adjust incentives for cost-effective 
healthcare?
Reflections on Economic Perspective
Economic analysis for the PKU monitors considered prob­
able expenses and returns within the present market. But it 
needed more: to consider how policies affect incentives for 
the development and use of the monitors, with special at­
tention to managing orphan conditions and to serving popula­
tions disadvantaged by chronic conditions.
Much is made of possibilities of market forces to contain 
healthcare costs, including incentives for cost-reducing in­
novation [7]. But the absence of conditions for a perfect mar­
ket also has been cataloged. Markets can encourage 
efficiency by allowing individuals to choose, on the basis of 
full costs, goods and service they value from competing pro­
ducers. But healthcare does not meet many market assump­
tions. For example, prices do not incorporate full societal 
costs. Consumers' tastes are not predetermined and are sub­
ject to influence through advertising and prevailing culture. 
Tastes also are not necessarily independent of the distribu­
tion of resources. Markets do not capture the satisfaction 
garnered by healthy individuals who desire that the sick and 
disabled be treated [8], These actual, not perfect, markets 
bias outcomes and produce inefficiencies.
Present markets work poorly for PKU. Being a rare condi­
tion, technology is seldom attentive. For the same reason, PKU 
families have difficulty becoming well informed. For technol­
ogy to manage chronic conditions that heavily burden patients 
and families, markets more likely capture cost savings to the 
payers (private insurance or government) than those generating 
better quality of life for patients and families. Low prevalence 
of orphan conditions limits demands for, and economic returns 
to, technologies. Low prevalence limits understanding of con­
ditions and their consequences, making the development and 
dissemination of technologies more difficult.
The types and extent of market inefficiencies and biases 
depend upon whether physicians, healthcare plans, or pa-
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ticnts predominate in purchasing choices. Especially when 
price docs not include all benefits and costs, it makes a dif­
ference who docs the buying and how the markets influence 
their tastes. Technology also is affected by the categorization 
of expenditures, as in capitated coverage that encourages de­
velopment and use of drugs and disease management tech­
nologies when they cost less than the alternative of acutc- 
carc procedures.
As a cottage industry, medicine favored procedures under­
stood by. controlled by. and beneficial to physician practitio­
ners. This resulted in a proclivity to value procedures over 
prevention. Institutionalization of medical care shifted the 
bias to products and services profitable to large organizations. 
Both cottagc-industry physicians and provider institutions 
may give less priority to cost-cffcctivcncss than would those 
paying for the care, and less priority to long-term quality of 
life than would their patients. The shifts in market structure to 
prospective payments and capitated care encourage cost man­
agement. Future changes in market structure, such as patient 
concerns about quality and choices of providers, will further 
adjust priorities.
Predictions arc inherently uncertain and rewards limited in 
markets for cost-saving technologies. This is partly because 
markets arc not perfect, and hcalthcarc markets will not be 
perfect. Further, because of the unequal distribution of re­
sources and of disease conditions, neither perfect nor imper­
fect markets will fully nor fairly meet the needs for health 
care. Finally, these circumstances arc exaggerated for orphan 
conditions. Yet markets have important roles—that may be in­
creased or improved—to allow for greater exercise of choice, 
to accommodate change, and to stimulate innovation. The 
Utah project showed the importance of going beyond the 
question of how the market is likely to accept proposed prod­
ucts and assess related policy questions about the importance 
of future market changes or supplements.
Since improvements in quality of life arc inadequately 
captured by the market, will political “markets’' develop sub­
sidies or regulations to encourage technology? Will a growing 
understanding of PKU by families increase their power and 
initiative to pressure for public programs supporting technol­
ogy development? Will family understanding of co-morbidi- 
tics be shared with insurers, increasing insurers’ interest in 
better treatment of the condition?
Challenging Markets
The environment for technology reflects two markets: eco­
nomic and political. In both cases, money is only part of 
what shapes and is transacted in these markets. These com­
plex markets, going beyond money, challenge simplistic 
predictions and easy rules of management. Individual pref­
erences shape the economic environment; these arc unsta­
ble preferences, influenced by cultures, promotions, 
events, and politics. Policy is at least as complicated; cul­
tures and events, as well as leadership, influence and 
change politics, the politics that adjust public, and private, 
policies. Technology shapes both the economic and politi­
cal markets. Persons developing technologies can benefit 
from an understanding of these two environments, espe­
cially an understanding that includes recognition that they 
can themselves change these environments.
Recognizing the complexity of economics and policy rec­
ognizes that understanding sometimes comes in a burst of in­
sight but more usually, and surely, builds in steps. The speed 
by which these steps arc taken, as well as their direction, arc 
different when the incremental efforts is integrated with 
technology development. It then is less likely to set bound­
aries. of limits and requirements described by outside advi­
sors. and more likely to open up thinking and possibilities. 
Integration also increases the chances that the lack of stabil­
ity in these markets offers opportunities as well as complica­
tions. as with the PKU importance of piggybacking the 
development and marketing of monitors upon similar tech­
nology for other conditions.
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